U.S. House of Representatives
Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Energy and Power

Public Hearing

Atlanta, Georgia
April 14, 1997

WRITTEN STATEMENT
OF
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA

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SUMMARY COMMENTS OF JAMES ALLISON ON BEHALF OF MEAG POWER
BEFORE THE
COMMERCE COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND POWER HEARING

Monday, April 14, 1997

- MEAG Power is a public corporation and instrumentality of the State of Georgia which provides the wholesale power supply to forty-nine of the fifty-two municipal electric systems in Georgia. MEAG Power and its Participants participate in the Georgia electric market along with Georgia Power Company and Savannah Electric, investor-owned utilities; as well as Oglethorpe Power Corporation and its forty-two electric membership corporations (EMCs).

- The State of Georgia enacted the Georgia Territorial Act in 1975, which has provided one of the most competitive electric markets in the country based on numerous competitive provisions, particularly the 900 kW customer choice provision. The Territorial Act has been a very successful competitive structure for the Georgia electric industry, and has not only promoted economic development and job growth as compared to other states, but also kept Georgia electric rates lower than the national average.

- As an active player in what has been one of the most competitive electric markets in the U.S. for over twenty years, MEAG Power supports competition. Georgia is a clear example that each state has its own set of unique circumstances in the move towards full retail competition. Any federal action should address parity between states, yet allow individual states ample room to devise solutions to fit their own unique circumstances.

- If federal legislation occurs, it should provide for adequate recovery of stranded costs for all utilities. The issue is not whether to have competition, but how a transition towards a more competitive market should develop.

- Generation and transmission of reliable electricity is capital intensive. State and locally owned public power systems (like MEAG Power and its Participants) rely on the "full faith and credit" of local governments to finance facilities, and as such have significant bonded indebtedness on their systems. This debt was incurred under a regulatory structure where MEAG Power and its Participants have a utility responsibility to serve, resulting in the benefit of lower costs for all the rate payers in Georgia. While IOUs may fall back on their shareholders, failure to provide for the recovery of stranded costs through rates or access charges would be detrimental to taxpayers in Georgia, with respect to MEAG Power and its Participants.

- While wholesale transmission is being deregulated by FERC pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, and the kWh commodity may well be deregulated—the distribution and transmission systems to supply the commodity should remain regulated as is the case today.

- Fair and effective competition must stress the importance of open access to transmission systems, and ultimately may evolve into independent system operators (ISOs).

- Public power should continue to be a player due to large taxpayer-guaranteed debt service issues and importantly, this system has been controlled and subject to "choice" at the local level, providing an economical source of power to customers/citizens, while helping to support local government without tax increases.

I. BACKGROUND ON MEAG POWER'S ROLE IN THE GEORGIA ELECTRIC INDUSTRY

The **Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia** ("**MEAG Power**") is the wholesale power supplier of forty-nine (49) of the fifty-two (52) municipalities which own and operate electric distribution systems in Georgia. Attached hereto is a list of the forty-nine (49) municipalities served by MEAG Power.

By way of background, there are fifty-two (52) municipal electric distribution systems in the State of Georgia consisting of forty-seven (47) cities and one (1) county (Crisp County), which are Participants in MEAG Power; the City of Acworth, which is a wholesale customer of MEAG Power; the City of Hampton, which is a wholesale customer of Georgia Power Company ("Georgia Power"); the City of Dalton, which is an owner of generation and transmission facilities; and the City of Chickamauga, which is a franchise distributor of TVA Power in northwest Georgia.

These municipal systems date back to the 1890's and early 1900's when they first began to provide central station electric service to their citizens. These municipal systems have been responsible for providing continuous electric service to their citizens and the inhabitants of their surrounding areas since electric service was first provided. Originally, most of these cities provided their own power from small plants which they owned and operated.

With the advent of large generating stations connected by transmission systems and the resultant lower costs from economies of scale, these municipal systems became wholesale power customers of Georgia Power. Following World War II, electric prices continued to drop due to the economies of scale and due to the expansive industrial growth after the war which continued to create more demand. The last municipally-owned generating plant was in Thomasville and was closed in about 1957. Crisp County Power Commission still maintains some generating facilities, including a hydro facility.

In the early 1960's, the Federal Power Commission ("FPC") began exercising its jurisdiction over wholesale power supply contracts, including the contracts between Georgia Power and the municipalities. At this time, prices began to increase as load growth reduced the existing generating capacity reserves. In order to remedy the situation, Georgia Power filed a series of wholesale rate increases before the FPC throughout the 1960's to provide revenues for new plant construction. During this period and extending into the early 1970's, Georgia Power planned and began implementation of the largest generation construction program in its history. Ultimately, this construction program included two nuclear plants, Plants Hatch and Vogtle, and two coal-burning plants, Plants Wansley and Scherer.

Georgia Power not only was supplying its own total retail load, but was supplying the wholesale requirements for both the municipalities and the electric membership corporations ("EMCs"), which are non-profit membership corporations organized under Georgia law. All of the construction costs for the new plants was being financed by Georgia Power from a single capital source, the corporate bond market. This placed tremendous strain on Georgia Power's financial ratings and resulted in increased interest costs.

A significant and sobering event for the municipals was Georgia Power's indication in the early 1970's that in the event of power shortages it would provide first for its retail load, and could not be responsible for supplying the wholesale requirements of the municipal systems.

At the same time that Georgia Power was seeking an operating license for Hatch Unit No. Two and a construction license for Vogtle Units No. One and Two, the Atomic Energy Act was being amended to require an anti-trust review by the Department of Justice. Under the settlement agreement reached as a result of the anti-trust review, Georgia Power agreed to sell to the municipals and to the EMCs appropriate shares of its

nuclear plants, and to provide transmission and partial requirements services to the municipals and EMCs in order to make such ownership feasible.

As the financial pressures of its large construction program continued to push down Georgia Power's financial ratings, Georgia Power agreed to offer ownership interests in Plants Wansley and Scherer to the municipals and the EMCs, in addition to shares in the nuclear plants. The EMCs formed a generation and transmission cooperative, Oglethorpe Power Corporation ("OPC"), to negotiate and acquire ownership of generation and transmission facilities to serve the wholesale requirements of the EMCs.

The municipals also began negotiations for ownership interests in these four plants and in the integrated transmission system. As a result, the General Assembly in 1975 created MEAG Power, a public corporation and instrumentality of the State, for the purpose of acquiring generation and transmission assets to provide wholesale power supply to the municipals.[1] The MEAG Power acquisitions in the four power plants were financed and the sales were completed in early 1977. The ownership interests in these plants were negotiated based upon the projected generation needed to meet the base load requirements of the municipal Participants. In order to make the acquisition of this generation and transmission project feasible, the municipals executed contracts which pledged their Full Faith and Credit to underwrite the bond financings.

The reason for emphasis on the financial condition of Georgia Power in the early 1970's, and the circumstances which led to the creation of MEAG Power and OPC, is to relate the importance of these events to the discussion of deregulation and restructuring of the electric industry in Georgia. By assuming responsibility for the ownership and financing of their respective generation and transmission requirements, the municipals, as well as the EMCs, relieved the financial and regulatory problems resulting from this large generation construction program. This construction program was essential to the

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1 *See* O.C.G.A. § 46-3-110, *et seq.* (the "MEAG Act").

continued reliability of the electric system and, consequently, to the prosperity of the State —growth through economic development, industrial growth and jobs for our citizens. Also, and equally important, it relieved the pressure on all of the electric rate payers of Georgia.

The construction program could now be financed from three sources of capital—the corporate bond market, the municipal bond market and the cooperatives' financial market.[2]

This was only possible for the municipals because of the commitment of their citizens—the owners of these electric distribution systems—to underwrite the acquisition of these assets with the pledge of their Full Faith and Credit.

In any electric industry restructuring, these financial commitments made by municipalities—and by Georgia Power and the EMCs—must not be undermined, because they were incurred on behalf of, and for the benefit of, our electric consumers which we have a utility responsibility to serve.

II. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF COMPETITION IN THE GEORGIA ELECTRIC INDUSTRY.

1. The Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act of 1973 (the "Territorial Act").

Current retail electric service in Georgia is provided pursuant to the Territorial Act which governs all retail electric service. The Territorial Act became effective March 29, 1973.[3] From a national standpoint, this Act resulted in Georgia being one of the most competitive electric markets in the country for over twenty years.

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[2] Indeed, the practical implications of the 1970's activities in Georgia to utilize sources of tax-free public financing to provide lower-cost capital to support investor-owned utility-initiated nuclear and other capital intensive capacity expansion is not unlike the recent "securitization" activities undertaken under restructuring initiatives in states such as California and Pennsylvania, the major difference being that Georgia was twenty years ahead of these other states.

[3] O.C.G.A. 46-3-1, *et seq.*

The Territorial Act is comprehensive with respect to retail electric service and generally provides for the assignment of service areas throughout the State by the Georgia Public Service Commission ("Georgia PSC") to the respective retail electric suppliers based upon the predominance of electric distribution lines in each assigned area. Provisions allow for service within the incorporated limits of municipalities as such limits existed in 1973 by the "Primary Supplier," that is, the electric supplier serving the preponderance of the retail customers within the city. Under this provision all incorporated areas (with minor exceptions) are assigned to either Georgia Power or one of the municipal systems, and the vast majority of the unincorporated geographic areas of the State are assigned to EMCs which have a predominance of lines in those areas.

2. Competition Under the Georgia Territorial Act.

Pursuant to the Territorial Act, all new retail electric load ("premises") locating within the State and which is outside of the 1973 incorporated limits of municipalities, and which at the time of initial full operation would equal 900 kW of connected demand, or greater, were designated as "customer choice" loads and the customer could choose any electric supplier to serve the Premises. Thus, since 1973 there has been competition among electric suppliers for customer choice loads. This provision of the Territorial Act has resulted in substantial competition for all customer choice loads.

From the standpoint of MEAG Power's members, the customer choice provision was the principal balancing feature of the Territorial Act because under the assignment provisions, municipalities were relegated to a confined service area, that is, the corporate limits plus any adjoining area in which they had lines; while Georgia Power to some extent, and the EMCs to a much greater extent, had assignment rights to much larger developing areas of the State. The right of municipalities to compete for customer choice loads throughout the State was an off-set which allowed municipalities an opportunity to keep their electric distribution systems more viable by providing some growth outside of

their relatively confined assigned areas. By promoting this feature of the Territorial Act, Georgia's municipal systems were a very early proponent of retail electric competition, perhaps among the first in the United States.

This competition has been beneficial to "choice" customers by providing competitive (i.e., lower) rates to customer choice load. The existence of benefits to customers not designated as "choice" load (i.e., "non-choice" customers) assigned to a single electric supplier, is the subject of some debate.

Additional competition results from the provision of the Territorial Act which allows "corridor rights" to lines of any electric supplier within the assigned area of another supplier. That is, if a customer locates within 500 feet of the lines of two electric suppliers, it may choose service from either.

Under the Territorial Act, electric suppliers have a utility obligation to serve their assigned customers and to provide competition for those customers which have a right to select them as the supplier of choice.

A connected load of 900 kW or greater, generally includes, for example, commercial loads such as large grocery stores or other retail establishments, motels, and most industry. This type load is substantial, although MEAG Power does not have data on a statewide basis.

3. Current Levels of Regulation of Electric Suppliers in Georgia.

Under the Constitution of the State of Georgia, municipal electric rates and service practices are exempt from regulation by the Georgia PSC.[4] This exemption is qualified by the Constitution, however, to the extent that if a municipality issues revenue bonds and extends electric service beyond the county or counties in which such municipality is

[4] Ga. Const. art. III, § 6, ¶ 5(d).

located, it becomes subject to regulation and taxation on that portion of its system.[5] Municipal systems in Georgia are regulated by local government.[6]

MEAG Power is not subject to Georgia PSC jurisdiction by virtue of its statute, as a public corporation.[7] EMC rates are exempt from regulation by the Georgia PSC by statute, but are subject to certain financial filing requirements. However, both municipalities and EMCs are subject to the rate filing and non-discrimination provisions of the Territorial Act.[8] Georgia Power and Savannah Electric retail prices are regulated by the Georgia PSC. Wholesale rates and service by investor-owned utilities are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission pursuant to the Federal Power Act.

The current structure of the electric industry in Georgia has produced an extremely reliable electric system, and provides service at prices which are reasonable when compared to many other States, and on average, the nation as a whole. The utility "obligation to serve" under the Territorial Act has been a serious responsibility which has been observed by the electric suppliers of the State. The large generation construction program pursued collectively by Georgia Power, MEAG Power and OPC in the 1970's through the joint ownership of facilities has served the State and its consumers well. Significant construction cost increases at Plant Vogtle have resulted in high embedded costs; these increases for the most part were the result of federally mandated Nuclear Industry changes and requirements after Three Mile Island, and changes in standards which followed. The generating facilities operate extremely well and are highly reliable.

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5 Ga. Const. art. IX, § 6, ¶ 2. Where revenue bonds are issued by any county, municipality, or other political subdivision of this state in order to buy, construct, extend, operate, or maintain gas or electric generating or distribution systems and necessary appurtenances thereof and the gas or electric generating or distribution system extends beyond the limits of the county in which the municipality or other political subdivision is located, then its services rendered and property located outside said county shall be subject to taxation and regulation in the same manner as are privately owned and operated utilities.

6 *Ga. PSC v. City of Albany*, 180 Ga. 355 (1934).

7 O.C.G.A. §46-3-152.

8 O.C.G.A. § 46-3-12.

The Georgia Integrated Transmission System (ITS), jointly formed and owned by Georgia Power, MEAG Power, OPC (now Georgia Transmission Company) and the City of Dalton, is unique to the industry. It is efficient and reliable, and very cost-effective.

The combination of the installed generation and the ITS reliability has provided an uncurtailed supply of electricity to consumers at reasonable prices, and importantly, has helped generate industrial and business growth to support jobs expansion and a growing economy which has made Georgia one of the fastest growing states in the country.

As mentioned earlier, the joint ownership of generation and transmission facilities has provided an efficient way of financing these assets from diverse sources which has produced lower carrying costs.

4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Current Georgia System.

The primary disadvantage of the current structure is the wide divergence in prices of power to the "choice" and "non-choice" customers. Competitive pressures have led to the pricing for larger "choice" loads largely on the basis of incremental costs while the "non-choice" customers (especially the smaller customers) still largely pay fully embedded costs. The effect of this price disparity is compounded by the industry trend—which appears to be accelerating—toward retail deregulation. This trend to deregulate the retail sale of electricity and the observation of the results achieved by "choice" customers has raised the expectations of virtually all large industrial users for cheaper, more efficient service, as well as the expectations of national or regional companies with multiple operations in several locations which in the aggregate also constitute large loads. Because of these expectations, both existing and prospective customers in these classes will increasingly make decisions based upon the availability and price of competitive utility service.

There are several positive attributes which must be retained. Obviously, the reliability and adequacy of the supply of electricity must be retained. Specifically, the

responsibility for these functions must be clearly defined, and all electric suppliers must share this responsibility. Care must also be exercised to insure that those classes of customers who have less relative market power, that is residential and small commercial users, do not pay a disproportionate share of the cost of service and that service availability is not compromised.

III. MEAG POWER'S COMMENTS ON ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING

1. Stranded Investment.

From the viewpoint of MEAG Power, the single biggest issue in restructuring is stranded investment, or stranded costs. When MEAG Power was formed for the reasons stated earlier, the municipalities contracted to underwrite the capital costs of the facilities to the benefit of all citizens and customers within the State of Georgia. The size of the load for which the municipalities and MEAG Power (as their wholesale supplier), were obligated to plan and build was projected based upon reasonable and accepted criteria. Both historical load patterns and projected growth were taken into account in the purchase of generation and transmission facilities. Based upon these projected requirements of the customers they were obligated by statute to supply, MEAG Power acquired and the municipalities guaranteed the debt on approximately Four Billion Dollars in generation and transmission facilities. These facilities provide reliable generating capacity for base load supply to these consumers projected to be sufficient until at least 2010. The contracts of the municipalities obligate not only the electric revenues of their electric distribution systems, but also carry a pledge of their full faith and credit, that is, their taxing power. This was required to achieve the most advantageous financing costs and to increase the feasibility of MEAG Power's projects. The result of this was lower costs to the electric consumer.

The introduction of full retail competition in Georgia would change the "utility responsibility" for serving these customers to one of open competition and could leave

MEAG Power and the municipalities with excess generation costs incurred to provide this service which could not be fully recovered on a competitive basis. This is because competitors who were under no responsibility to build for this load can shop the markets, and take advantage of generation which may be temporarily excess to other suppliers' needs, or produced from cheaper, and possibly less reliable, generation facilities off of the Georgia system. This would put Georgia municipalities and their taxpayers at substantial risk.

This situation, because of the jointly-owned facilities, not only applies to MEAG Power and its Participants, but also pertains to Georgia Power and the EMCs. However, unlike investor owned utilities like Georgia Power whose equity owners could possibly be looked to for absorption of some portion of the stranded investment, in the case of MEAG Power and its Participants, the sole source of revenue to cover such costs rests with the citizens and tax payers of these municipalities.

While both MEAG Power and the Participant Cities are acting responsibly to mitigate the effect of stranded costs, it will likely be impossible to alleviate the entire problem without provisions to ensure that costs which were prudently incurred are recoverable. There must be reasonable provisions developed to apply uniformly to electric suppliers which would allow for the calculation and collection of these costs as competition is phased-in.

Any restructuring proposal should also support the fair and equitable recovery of distribution costs and a reasonable return for the use of municipal distribution facilities which would be allowed in a restructuring.

With respect to Georgia, it is our view that in any restructuring of the electric industry in Georgia, it is the generation, or kWh commodity, which should be the subject of competition. Clearly, the Georgia Territorial Act should be retained in some form as the mechanism for the regulation of ownership, construction and extension of distribution and transmission lines. A key component of restructuring is opening up the transmission

system and the various distribution systems to use by qualified electric suppliers which will compete for the sale of energy to consumers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has, pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, actively pursued the deregulation of the wholesale transmission of electric energy. While such efforts have had the effect of increasing access for many parties, further steps—such as the formation of independent system operators (ISOs)—are being encouraged by many regulatory bodies and are being actively pursued in several parts of the country. It is MEAG Power's belief that the ISO concept is one with great promise that deserves further active consideration.

The transmission and distribution systems must continue to be owned and operated so as to give effect to: (1) environmental objectives of efficient use of rights-of-way and non-duplication of facilities; (2) protection of investment in transmission and distribution facilities and a reasonable return thereon; and (3) reliability and coordination of electric systems. Georgia has been served well by the Integrated Transmission System and it should be continued, subject to open access requirements.

The distribution systems should continue to be owned and extended on a regulated basis, with rules for comparable use by qualified electric suppliers. This use should be conditioned upon payment of reasonable distribution rates which recover costs plus a reasonable return. Distribution owners should not be precluded from competing in the sale of power, subject to rules preventing discrimination against non-owners.

2. Competition and Tax Considerations.

MEAG Power supports customer choice and competition, but only on terms that make sense for our citizens here in Georgia and for the MEAG Power Participants. The real issue to debate is not whether to have competition, but how the transition to a more competitive market should develop.

Specifically, MEAG Power again notes that the existing competitive system here in Georgia has provided and continues to provide low electric rates and reliable electric

service. The Georgia PSC is currently investigating how to introduce even greater competition while at the same time retaining those positive attributes of the current system which have worked well in the past.[9] MEAG Power is actively participating in those proceedings, and believes that the State of Georgia, through the Georgia PSC and Legislature, should be permitted to proceed at the appropriate pace in fixing the terms and conditions upon which additional customer choice will be introduced in Georgia. What works in California or Pennsylvania, where the past and current circumstances and conditions were and are quite different, may not be appropriate for Georgia, and vice versa.

This does not mean that no federal legislation will be required; in particular we would note the problems caused for MEAG Power and similarly situated public power entities by the federal tax code and its rules on tax exempt financing, the so-called "private use" problem, which need to be addressed by federal legislation. Simply put, federal tax rules limit the kinds of contracts MEAG Power can sign with customers; thus, MEAG Power is limited in disposing of excess capacity, both output and generating assets, whether the excess results from competition or system needs. MEAG Power may well be limited in participating in a different transmission access regime, such as an independent system operator (ISO), other than the Georgia ITS which already exists in Georgia. These are problems which exist even now, and through our membership in the Large Public Power Council we have been active in seeking relief from these outdated rules from both the IRS and the Congress. Without such relief, our customers and our investors will suffer unfairly. While we realize that this issue is not within the direct jurisdiction of this committee, we ask this Congressional committee, with jurisdiction over electricity, to do everything possible to help the tax writing committees understand the nature of our problem and the need to remove this barrier to competition as soon as possible.

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9 Georgia PSC Docket No. 7313-U.

Finally, relief from the private use rules is simply another way of mitigating our potential stranded costs; however, that alone will likely not be enough to enable us to recover those stranded costs. Thus, if comprehensive federal legislation is enacted, we strongly urge that it contain clear federal support for the principle that prudently incurred stranded costs be recovered. While it is certainly the role of the states or appropriate local jurisdictions to determine the specifics of stranded costs recovery, a federal statement of the validity of such recovery must accompany any legislation that may be enacted on electricity restructuring.

3. Other Issues—Reciprocity and Market Power.

On the reciprocity issue, MEAG Power believes there is a valid federal role in ensuring that interstate transactions are accomplished officially, reliably and economically. As markets are potentially opened up in certain states, electric suppliers in those states should be given reciprocal competitive rights in other markets where those other market players participate in the more competitive markets.

Fair and open competition also requires that due regard be given for potential abuse of market power. Any federal legislation should acknowledge that potential abuse of market power must be kept in check by appropriate safeguards so that a large player may not use its market power in an anti-competitive manner.

In closing, I wish to emphasize that public power entities—like the participating cities in MEAG Power—have played an important role in the evolution and development of what most regard as the premier electrical system in the world. Municipal power has existed for the benefit of its citizens and is under the ongoing direct control of elected local officials; if at any time it fails to meet its customers'/citizens' needs and wishes, it can be dissolved, sold or otherwise divested or changed. To that effect, municipal power systems have always been subject to "choice" by its customers/citizens. The "choice" that nearly fifty cities in Georgia have made is to pledge—through taxpayer-guaranteed debt—

their full faith and credit—to allow the benefits that public power has and can continue to bring to the cities' customers/citizens. This includes the benefit of utilizing revenues from municipal utility operations to mitigate the need for tax increases or other revenue sources.

Much has been said regarding the "level playing field" and it has previously been observed that this may be "in the eyes of the beholder." While it is true that public power does have access to tax-free debt financing, investor-owned utility systems have access to a variety of capital markets not available to public power entities, and indeed have themselves made extensive use of tax-free financing in the past. While it is clear that differences exist between the two forms of ownership, it is very unclear in which direction the "field" may or may not be tilting. As to just one simple example, public power—by virtue of its public status—generally must operate in an "open meeting," "open records," or a "Sunshine law" environment, whereas investor-owned systems can operate much more confidentially. In a truly competitive environment, this could be a very significant disadvantage to public power. While strong arguments can be made that right now the various advantages and disadvantages largely affect each other and overall parity may exist, if efforts are made to "level the playing field" we suggest that all portions of that "field" must be dealt with and that the examination should not be limited to one portion—public power's access to tax-exempt financing—as has been suggested by some investor-owned utilities.

MEAG Power appreciates the opportunity to offer its comments herein, and will be pleased to offer further input and information as this process develops.

Respectfully submitted, this 10th day of April, 1977.

Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia
James M. Allison
President & Chief Executive Officer

MEAG Power Participants*

Adel	Fort Valley
Albany	Grantville
Barnesville	LaGrange
Blakely	Lawrenceville
Brinson	Mansfield
Buford	Marietta
Cairo	Monroe
Calhoun	Monticello
Camilla	Moultrie
Cartersville	Newnan
College Park	Norcross
Commerce	Oxford
Covington	Palmetto
Crisp County	Quitman
Doerun	Sandersville
Douglas	Sylvania
East Point	Sylvester
Elberton	Thomaston
Ellaville	Thomasville
Fairburn	Washington
Fitzgerald	West Point
Forsyth	Whigham

*MEAG Power is also the wholesale electric supplier for the City of Acworth, although Acworth is not a Participant.

James M. Allison
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Education:

BS, University of Tennessee - Economics & Business Administration
MA, University of Illinois - Industrial & Labor Relations

Prior Positions Held:

Kentucky Utilities Company (1993-97)

Senior Vice President, Customer Operations & Marketing
Vice President, Human Resources

American Electric Power Company (1983-93)

President & Chief Operating Officer, Wheeling Power Company
Division Manager, Indiana & Michigan Electric Company
Assistant to President, Indiana & Michigan Electric Company
Labor Relations Manager, Indiana & Michigan Electric Company

Tennessee Valley Authority (1977-83)

Staff Chief
Assistant to General Manager
Various staff positions

Disclosure Statement of Municipal Electric Authority of Georgia
Pursuant to Rule XI, Clause 2(G)(4) of the Rules
of the House Of Representatives and Rule 4(B)(2)
of the House Commerce Committee

MEAG Power presently maintains a contract to provide energy services to a U.S. Postal Service bulk mail facility in Atlanta, Georgia. In addition, certain MEAG Power Participants maintain electric service contracts with federal entities, including various U.S. Postal Service facilities, federal courthouses, and other various governmental buildings and installations.